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CRYPTOGRAPHY EXPORT CONTROLS — CANADA’S
DICHOTOMOUS CRYPTOGRAPHY POLICY
Paul Bates †

Introduction 1

of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(Charter). 6 The effort to erect strong legal barriers to
trans-national distribution of cryptography has significant gaps because strong cryptography can be obtained
and used within Canada without legal restrictions. This
paper advocates that Canada should exercise its discretion under the WA to diminish, not fortify, the restrictions of the export control regime.
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C

ryptography makes electronic transactions more
secure and reliable. Recognizing the importance of
cryptography to e-commerce, the Canadian government
adopted a digital cryptography policy in 1998. The
policy provides for ‘‘digital freedom’’ for domestic cryptography by permitting Canadians to develop, import,
and use for lawful purposes, any cryptographic products,
without restrictions based upon the strength of the cryptography, the source of supply, the identity of the recipient, or the nature of the use.
Cryptography originated from military intelligence
activities, principally in the Second World War.
Advanced modern cryptography is vital to national
defence undertakings. The military significance of cryptography is reflected in the classification of cryptography
as a ‘‘Dual-Use Technology’’ in The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Weapons
and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (WA). 2 The WA
is an international accord between 33 nations, including
Canada, dedicated to reducing the international distribution of dangerous goods and technologies. It was implemented in Canada through the Export and Import Permits Act (EIPA), 3 which was recently amended through
the Public Safety Act, 2002 (PSA) 4 in response to the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Although the
amendments have yet to come into force, 5 they will
require a permit to transfer controlled cryptography out
of Canada.
Canada’s cryptographic policy, which promises
domestic digital freedom, and the recent EIPA amendments, which fortify export controls, are inconsistent.
This problem is amplified by the lack of borders in
cyberspace. Export controls impose transaction costs on
Canada’s domestic cryptography industry and provide
an incentive to locate cryptography research, development and production outside of Canada. For example,
Israel has a significant cryptography development
industry, and does not subscribe to the WA. The export
controls may also impair expressive communications
about cryptography through unconstitutional prior
restraints on commercial and academic speech, contrary
to the guarantee of freedom of expression in section 2

Export Controls
Wassenaar Arrangement

T

he WA received final approval by 33 co-founding
countries 7 in July 1996, and was implemented in
September 1996. It supplanted the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM)
Export Control Regime, which ceased to exist on
March 31, 1994. 8 COCOM was established in 1949 to
control strategic goods and technology on the basis of
informal agreement and consensus management. It
maintained a secretariat in Paris, as well as permanent
delegates. 9 At the end of the Cold War, the COCOM
Export Control Regime recognized the need for a new
arrangement to address risks to regional and international security from the spread of conventional weapons
and dual-use goods and technologies.
The WA balances national security interests with
commercial objectives through state objectives. The first
purpose is to contribute to regional and international
security and stability. This is achieved by promoting
transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies,
and by preventing destabilizing accumulations of dangerous weapons. The second purpose is to complement
and reinforce existing control regimes for weapons of
mass destruction, without derogating from existing internationally recognized measures for this purpose. The
third purpose is to enhance cooperation among the participating states to prevent the acquisition of armaments
and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies, in areas
or regions identified by the participating states to be of
concern to them. The fourth purpose is a limiting prin-

†Barrister, Toronto, Ontario. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Cecilia Faeron and Tamara Lennox.
199

✄ REMOVE

Username: Shirley.Spalding

Date: 23-DEC-05

Time: 14:06

Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\04_03\BatesNew.dat

Seq: 2

200
ciple juxtaposed against the security and stability objectives set out in purposes one through three: the participating states agreed not to impair or interfere with the
rights of states to acquire legitimate means of selfdefence, pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter of the
United Nations. In addition, the participating states
agreed not to impede lawful civil transactions. A fifth
purpose was added at the seventh plenary session of
December 2001, in reaction to the horrific events of
September 11, 2001. The newest aim is to prevent terrorists from acquiring conventional arms and dual-use
goods and technologies.
The WA is a voluntary protocol of member states.
The WA states that, ‘‘[a]ll measures undertaken with
respect to the Arrangement will be in accordance with
national legislation and policies and will be implemented on the basis of national discretion’’. 10 The participating states are therefore free to determine the manner
of implementation of the WA’s objectives. They also
reserve the right to transfer, or to deny transfer, of any
item, subject to the WA’s objectives. 11
The WA contemplates that the participating states
will exchange information on matters of concern, such
as emerging trends in weapons programs, the accumulation of particular weapons systems, or other dangers
according to a protocol derived from the categories of
the UN Registrar of Conventional Arms. Any information exchanged under the WA is subject to confidentiality on the basis of privileged diplomatic communications.
The WA informs cryptography public policy formulation by the participating states. The basic feature of the
WA is the control of the export of identified goods
through export permits. The WA says nothing about
intra-state transactions in goods; it applies to the export
of goods and articles on the list of dual-use goods and
technologies.

Implementation of the WA in Canada’s
Domestic Law
The WA was implemented in Canada by giving
effect to executive powers conferred by the EIPA. The
Governor in Council is empowered to create an Export
Control List (ECL) under section 3 of the EIPA and an
Area Control List (ACL) under section 4. 12 The identified
purpose of the EIPA is ‘‘to implement an intergovernmental arrangement or commitment’’. 13

The Permit Procedure
International Trade Canada, formerly the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT),
considers the ECL to be a comprehensible statutory
instrument for exporters who are presumed to be knowledgeable about the goods and articles they distribute.
However, ‘‘[n]ovice users can find themselves swamped
in so much information they lose sight of what they are
looking for’’. 14 This is because the ECL is ‘‘a lengthy and
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very technical list of goods that require federal permits if
they are exported’’. 15 International Trade Canada assists
exporters by publishing A Guide to Canada’s Export
Controls (Guide), 16 which the ECL incorporates as law. 17
The Guide provides plain language answers to the following commonly asked questions: 18
(A) Do I Need An Export Permit?
(B) Why Do Export Controls Exist?
(C) How Do I Obtain An Export Permit?
(D) Do I Need A Permit For Exports To The
United States?
(E) Do I Need a Permit For The Export of U.S.
Origin Goods or Technology?
(F) What Other Export Control Issues Should I Be
Aware of?
(G) What Are The Export Permit Requirements
For Forest Products?
(H) What Administrative Procedures Are Applicable In The Processing of Export Permits?
(I) What Supporting Documentation Is Required?
(J) What Does Customs Require And What Do I
Do If My Goods Are Detained?
(K) What Is Canada’s Legislative And Policy Basis
For Export Controls?
(L) What Are Canada’s Multilateral Commitments
And How Do They Relate To The ECL?
(M) How Do I Use The ECL And Find Information In This Guide?
(N) What Goods Are Subject To Import Controls?
(O) What Are The Current Notices To Exporters?
(P) What Acronyms Are Used In This Guide?

International Trade Canada also publishes a Notice
to Exporters, 19 which explains a number of expected
changes to the export permit process for cryptographic
goods and directs cryptography exporters to the appropriate permits.
An exporter can apply for a General Export Permit
(GEP) from International Trade Canada, by following
the instructions set out in the GEP–Ext. 1042 ‘‘Application For Permit To Export Goods’’ Application Form. 20 A
GEP enables an exporter to apply for a pre-authorization
for imports and exports of certain eligible goods. However, qualification depends on whether the goods or
their destination are in eligible classes; the GEP is referable to the character of goods and is not available for
goods exported to states on the ACL or on the list of U.S.
origin goods.
An individual export permit from International
Trade Canada is required for U.S. origin goods and for
the export of goods to states on the ACL. Exporters must
consider the components of the goods, their origin and
the permit requirements. International Trade Canada
indicates that review and approval takes 10 working days
and some goods require four to six weeks. 21 Customs
Canada mandates that exporters who have obtained
approval must record their approval number in Canada
Customs B-13A documents when exporting goods. 22
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International Trade Canada does not reveal the criteria it applies in considering requests for export permits.
One of the reasons for the lack of transparency is that
International Trade Canada relies on discussions with
other agencies and WA members in making its decisions, including the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, which may in turn consult the United States’s
national government security agencies.
The International Trade Canada Guide contains an
index of ECL-controlled goods, but it is inconclusive, as
it often refers to items using generic names or other
terms, instead of common names. Exporters must therefore consider the numerous, complex descriptions and
classifications of goods and technologies. International
Trade Canada provides a flow chart of the decisionmaking involved in understanding the permit process: 23
The decision process for obtaining a Federal
Export Permit from Department of Foreign
Affairs and International Trade 24

The Area Control List
The ACL controls goods based on their destination;
it identifies the countries to which persons in Canada
cannot export goods without a special permit. 28 The
export of goods to these states is restricted, regardless of
whether the goods are on any other control list.
Myanmar (Burma) is currently the only country on this
list.

U.S. Origin Goods — Item 5400 Group 5
Pursuant to Item 5400 Group 5 of the ECL, U.S.
origin goods cannot be exported from Canada except by
permit, to prevent the goods from being sent to countries that may use the goods inappropriately. Item 5400
defines U.S. origin goods as follows:
All goods that originate in the United States, unless they are
included elsewhere in this List, whether in bond or cleared
by Canadian Customs, other than goods that have been
further processed or manufactured outside the United
States so as to result in a substantial change in value, form or
use of the goods or in the production of new goods. (All
destinations other than the United States) 29

Seq: 3

Irrespective of destination or nature, U.S. origin goods
require an export permit.

The Export Control List
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The ECL divides goods that require export permits
into eight groups, based upon the goods’ nature and
component parts. Group 1 Item 1150 — Information
Security 30 of the Dual-Use List 31 concerns cryptographic
products. The restrictions and exemptions in this complex law must be reviewed with care.
The Restrictions of Items 1151–1155 of the ECL
Item 1150 of the Dual-Use List controls cryptographic products required for information security. It
states that

Export permits for goods in group one (Category
1150: Information Security), which covers cryptography,
are valid for two years, without extension. 25 The GEP is
designed to minimize the administrative burden on
exporters and to streamline licensing procedures; instead
of submitting individual export permit applications,
exporters can apply for general export permits that allow
certain goods to be exported to eligible destinations.
Examples of these GEPs are the General Export Permit
No. Ex. 18 — Portable Personal Computers and Associated Software 26 and the General Export Permit No. 39
— Mass Market Cryptographic Software. 27
The legal authority for the permit process is
explained in the subsequent sections in the following
sequence: the Area Control List, U.S. Origin Goods, and
the Export Control List.

The control status of ‘‘information security’’ 32 equipment,
‘‘software’’ 33 systems, application specific ‘‘electronic assemblies,’’ 34 modules, integrated circuits, components or functions is determined in this Category even if they are components or ‘‘electronic assemblies’’ of other equipment. 35

Item 1151 describes the following restricted systems, equipment and components:
1. Systems, equipment, application specific ‘‘electronic
assemblies’’, modules or integrated circuits for
‘‘information security’’, as follows, and other specially
designed components therefor: N.B. For the control
of global navigation satellite systems receiving equipment containing or employing decryption (i.e., GPS
or GLONASS), see 1071.5.
(a) Designed or modified to use ‘‘cryptography’’
employing digital techniques performing any
cryptographic function other than authentication
or digital signature having any of the following:

Technical Notes:
1. Authentication and digital signature functions
include their associated key management function.
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2. Authentication includes all aspects of access
control where there is no encryption of files or
text except as directly related to the protection
of passwords, Personal Identification Numbers
(PINs) or similar data to prevent unauthorized
access.
3. ‘‘Cryptography’’ does not include ‘‘fixed’’ data
compression or coding techniques.

Note: 1151.1.a. includes equipment designed or
modified to use ‘‘cryptography’’ employing analogue principles when implemented with digital
techniques.
1. A ‘‘symmetric algorithm’’ employing a key
length in excess of 56 bits; or
2. An ‘‘asymmetric algorithm’’ where the security
of the algorithm is based on any of the following:
(a) Factorization of integers in excess of 512 bits
(e.g., RSA);
(b) Computation of discrete logarithms in a
multiplicative group of a finite field of size
greater than 512 bits (e.g., Diffie-Hellman
over Z/pZ); or

Seq: 4

(c) Discrete logarithms in a group other than
mentioned in 1151.1.a.2.b. in excess of 112
bits (e.g., Diffie-Hellman over an elliptic
curve);
(b) Designed or modified to perform cryptanalytic
functions;
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(c) Deleted;
(d) Specially designed or modified to reduce the
compromising emanations of informationbearing signals beyond what is necessary for
health, safety or electromagnetic interference
standards;
(e) Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate the spreading code for ‘‘spread
spectrum’’ systems, including the hopping code
for ‘‘frequency hopping’’ systems;
(f) Designed or modified to use cryptographic techniques to generate channelizing or scrambling
codes for ‘‘timemodulated ultra-wideband’’ systems;
(g) Designed or modified to provide certified or certifiable ‘‘multilevel security’’ or user isolation at a
level exceeding Class B2 of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) or
equivalent;
(h) Communications cable systems designed or
modified using mechanical, electrical or electronic means to detect surreptitious intrusion. 36

Item 1152 refers to test, inspection and production
equipment in terms very close to the WA:
1. Equipment specifically designed for
(a) The ‘‘development’’ of equipment or functions
controlled by Category 1150, including measuring or test equipment;
(b) The ‘‘production’’ of equipment or functions
controlled by Category 1150, including measuring, test, repair or production equipment.
(c) Measuring equipment specially designed to evaluate and validate the ‘‘information security’’ functions controlled by 1151 or 1154. 37

Item 1153 is blank, as no restrictions have been
categorized as materials.
Item 1154 refers to software as
1. ‘‘Software’’ specially designed or modified for the
‘‘development’’, ‘‘production’’ or ‘‘use’’ of equipment
or ‘‘software’’ controlled by Category 1150.
2. ‘‘Software’’ specially designed or modified to support
‘‘technology’’ controlled by 1155.
3. Specific ‘‘software’’ as follows:
(a) ‘‘Software’’ having the characteristics or performing or simulating the functions of the equipment controlled by 1151 or 1152;
(b) ‘‘Software’’ to certify ‘‘software’’ controlled by
1154.3.a. 38

Note that 1154 does not control
(a) ‘‘Software’’ required for the ‘‘use’’ of equipment
excluded from control under the Note to 1151.
(b) ‘‘Software’’ providing any of the functions or equipment excluded from control under the Note to
1151. 39

Item 1155 refers to technology as
1. ‘‘Technology’’ according to the General Technology
Note for the ‘‘development’’, ‘‘production’’ or ‘‘use’’
of equipment or ‘‘software’’ controlled by Category
1150. 40

Exemptions from Items 1150–1155 of the ECL
There are a number of exemptions from the
description of controlled goods described in Items
1150–1155. Goods that fall within exemptions do not
require export permits.
Item 1151 of the ECL exempts specified technology
from the permit process of the EIPA, based on commercial application or use. This includes:
(a) ‘‘Personalized smart cards’’ where the cryptographic
capability is restricted for use in equipment or systems excluded from control under entries b. to f. of
this Note. If a ‘‘personalized smart card’’ has multiple functions, the control status of each function is
assessed individually.
(b) Receiving equipment for radio broadcast, pay television or similar restricted audience broadcast of
the consumer type, without digital encryption
except that exclusively used for sending the billing
or programme-related information back to the
broadcast providers;
(c) Equipment where the cryptographic capability is
not user-accessible and which is specially designed
and limited to allow any of the following:
1. Execution of copy-protected software;
2. Access to any of the following:
(a) Copy-protected contents stored on read-only
media; or
(b) Information stored in encrypted form on
media (e.g., in connection with the protection
of intellectual property rights) when the media
is offered for sale in identical sets to the public;
or
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3. One-time copying of copyright protected
audio/video data.
(d) Cryptographic equipment specially designed and
limited for banking use or money transactions;

Technical Note:
‘‘Money transactions’’ in 1151 Note d. includes the
collection and settlement of fares or credit functions.
(e) Portable or mobile radiotelephones for civil use
(e.g., for use with commercial civil cellular radiocommunications systems) that are not capable of
end-to-end encryption;
(f) Cordless telephone equipment not capable of endto-end encryption where the maximum effective
range of unboosted cordless operation (i.e., a single,
unrelayed hop between terminal and home base
station) is less than 400 metres according to the
manufacturer’s specifications. 41
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The provisions of the General Technology Note
(GTN) and the General Software Note (GSN) attenuate
the force of the ECL as it relates to cryptographic products. These notes establish significant exemptions for
software in the public domain, mass market (retail)
software, basic scientific research, and the minimum
information necessary for a patent application. The GTN
states:
The export of ‘‘technology’’ which is ‘‘required’’ for the
‘‘development’’, ‘‘production’’ or ‘‘use’’ of products controlled in the Dual-Use List is controlled according to the
provisions in each Category. This ‘‘technology’’ remains
under control even when applicable to any uncontrolled
product.
Controls do not apply to that ‘‘technology’’ which is the
minimum necessary for the installation, operation, maintenance (checking) and repair of those products which are not
controlled or whose export has been authorized.

N.B.: This does not release the repair ‘‘technology’’ controlled by Category in entries 1015.2.e. & 1015.2.f. and
1085.2.a. & 1085.2.b.
Controls do not apply to ‘‘technology’’, ‘‘in the public
domain’’, to ‘‘basic scientific research’’ 42 or to the minimum
necessary information for patent applications. 43

The GSN provides that
The Dual-Use List does not control ‘‘software’’ which is
either
1. Generally available to the public by being:
(a) Sold from stock at retail selling points, without
restriction, by means of:
1. Over-the-counter transactions;
2. Mail order transactions; or
3. Telephone call transactions; and
(b) Designed for installation by the user without further substantial support by the supplier; or

N.B.
Entry 1 of the General Software Note does not
release ‘‘software’’ controlled by Category 1150.
2. ‘‘In the public domain’’. 44

Mass market software must be ‘‘in the public
domain’’. The phrase ‘‘in the public domain’’ means
technology or software that has been made available
without restrictions upon its further dissemination.
[Copyright restrictions do not remove ‘‘technology’’ or
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‘‘software’’ from being ‘‘in the public domain’’. 45] What is
at any particular point in time ‘‘in the public domain’’ is
a question of fact to be determined by International
Trade Canada.

Interpretation of the EIPA Prohibition and
Offence Provisions
The Nature of the Problem
The EIPA controls tangible objects based on
national borders. This paper questions the efficacy of the
EIPA with respect to the control of intangible software in
borderless cyberspace.
The EIPA imposes export controls by prohibiting
the export, or attempted export, of goods in contravention of the ECL and ACL, pursuant to section 13:
No person shall export or attempt to export any goods
included in an Export Control List or any goods to any
country included in an Area Control List except under the
authority of and in accordance with an export permit issued
under this Act. [Emphasis added]

This section is reinforced by subsection 15(1), which
is designed to capture any efforts at circumvention in
third countries, as follows:
Subject to subsection (2), except with the authority in
writing of the Minister, no person shall knowingly do anything in Canada that causes or assists or is intended to cause
or assist any shipment, transhipment or diversion of any
goods included in an Export Control List to be made from
Canada or any other place, to any country included in an
Area Control List.
(2) No person shall knowingly do anything in Canada
that causes or assists or is intended to cause or assist any
shipment, transhipment or diversion of any thing referred to
in any of paragraphs 4.1(a) to (c), or any component or part
designed exclusively for assembly into such a thing, that is
included in an Export Control List, from Canada or any
other place, to any country that is not included in an Automatic Firearms Country Control List. [Emphasis added]

The offence provision of the EIPA is found in subsection 19(1):
19(1) Every person who contravenes any provision of
this Act or the regulations is guilty of
(a) an offence punishable on summary conviction and
is liable to a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding twelve months or to both; or
(b) an indictable offence and liable to a fine in an
amount that is in the discretion of the court or to
imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years,
or to both.

Interpretation of ‘‘Export’’
‘‘Export’’ is not defined in the EIPA, but is defined in
Black’s Law Dictionary 46 as follows:
To carry or send abroad. To send, take, or carry an article of
trade or commerce out of the country. To transport merchandise or goods from one country to another in the
course of trade, to carry out or convey goods by sea. Transportation of goods from . . . to a foreign country.
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. . . in connection with any writing or notice means to
deposit in the mail or deliver for transmission by any other
usual means of communication with postage or cost of
transmission provided for and properly addressed and in the
case of an instrument to an address specified thereon or
otherwise agreed, or if there be none, to any address reasonable under the circumstances. The receipt of any writing or
notice within that time at which it would have arrived if
properly sent has the effect of a proper sending.

The gravamen of an act of export is the transfer of
something from inside Canada to outside Canada. It
may not cover a situation where a person in Canada
causes something to be transmitted from one location
outside Canada to another location outside Canada. The
EIPA would not prevent a Canadian cryptography
vendor from receiving orders in Canada to ship cryptographic software from a server outside Canada to a recipient outside Canada. Consider the case of a Canadian
cryptography supplier intending to make software available via the Internet. The EIPA requires the intent to
transfer out of Canada. There are mechanisms available
to zone commercial activity on the Internet, such as
requirements for customers to certify their physical and
digital locations. Suppose that a supplier decides to offer
cryptography software from a Canadian server to customers who certify by reasonable means, such as digital
certification, that their server is located in Canada. The
Canadian supplier would not be required to inquire as
to whether the receiving server in Canada is being used
to transfer cryptography out of Canada. If the customer is
located outside Canada and causes cryptographic
software to be transmitted from the receiving server in
Canada to outside Canada, the export act is committed
by a person outside Canada and not the Canadian supplier, who would not know the customer’s ultimate location.
The Interpretation of ‘‘Goods’’
The use of the term ‘‘article’’ in section 3 of the EIPA
reinforces the interpretation of ‘‘goods’’ as tangible
objects. An article is defined as ‘‘a member of a class of
things; especially an item of goods’’. 48 In Black’s Law
Dictionary, the definition of ‘‘goods’’ 49 is
Goods — a term of variable content and meaning. It may
include every species of personal property or it may be given
a very restrictive meaning. Items of merchandise, supplies,
raw materials, or finished goods. Sometimes the meaning of
‘‘goods’’ is extended to include all tangible items, as in the
phrase ‘‘goods and services’’. All things (including specially
manufacturing goods) which are movable at any time of
identification to the contract for sale, other than the money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities and
things in action. This also includes the unborn of animals
and growing crops and other identified things attached to
realty as fixtures. All things treated as moveable for the
purpose of a contract of storage or transportation.

Cryptographic algorithms can be expressed in
software posted on the Internet. Cryptography is intangible software. Can the definition of ‘‘goods’’ under the
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EIPA include intangible software? In Regina v. Vanek, Ex
parte Cross, 50 the accused was charged under the EIPA
with exporting bags of silver coins from Canada. The
accused brought a motion to prohibit the hearing of the
charges on the grounds that the term ‘‘goods’’ in the
Export Control List did not include money, such as silver
coins, and that it was ultra vires for the Order in Council
to add silver coins to the list. The Court dismissed the
application, holding that silver coins constituted ‘‘goods’’,
which the Governor in Council properly added to the
Export Control List. When not used as currency, the
silver coins were goods.
Sections 13, 14 and 15 of the EIPA do not refer to
‘‘goods’’ and ‘‘articles’’ in isolation; these terms refer to
the expansion in the ECL. The extensive definitions and
detailed provisions of the ECL indicate a legislative
intention to regulate cryptographic hardware and
software. Category 1150 information security is defined
in the Guide as
All the means and functions ensuring the accessibility, confidentiality or integrity of information or communications,
excluding the means and functions intended to safeguard
against malfunctions. This includes ‘‘cryptography’’, cryptanalysis, protection against compromising emanations and
computer security. 51

Cryptography, on the other hand, is defined as
The discipline which embodies principles, means and
methods for the transformation of data in order to hide its
information content, prevent its undetected modification or
prevent its unauthorized use. ‘‘Cryptography’’ is limited to
the transformation of information using one or more secret
parameters (e.g., crypto variables) or associated key management. 52

These definitions, to the extent that they cover abstract
or intangible matters, are inconsistent with the natural
and ordinary meaning of the word ‘‘goods’’ as referring
to a tangible item. It is difficult to conceive of digital
communication as goods. The Guide, which may evidence the legislative intention, suggests in several places
that only tangible items are contemplated:
Reminder: Canada Customs compares the goods described
on the export permit and Customs Declaration form B-13A
or equivalent export documentation with the contents of
the shipment. Discrepancies in the documentation,
including goods being exported without the required
permit, could result in the export being detained, pending
clarification, or in extreme cases, seized. 53

These words imply that an element of physicality or
tangibility is contemplated. It is unlikely that detention
or seizure could refer to anything but tangible items.
It is questionable whether a string of zeros and ones,
communicated using electric pulses, could be considered
tangible. 54 In assessing a similar provision in the Australian export laws, solicitor Patrick Gunning 55 argued that
Australian export controls must satisfy two conditions to
apply to the supply of encryption software via the
Internet. 56 First, software must come within the definition of ‘‘goods’’, and second, the transmission of data
from a server in Australia to a person outside Australia
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must constitute ‘‘exportation’’. 57 Gunning found support
for his argument in Australia in the case of Re: Michael
Vickers, which was similar to the Vanek case in
Canada. 58 Mr. Vickers had $8,000 in cash and a credit
balance of $15,000 in a bank account. Both were seized
by customs officers pursuant to their authority to seize
‘‘goods’’ under the Customs Act. Morling J. held that the
term ‘‘goods’’ as defined referred to tangible objects that
are physically movable. 59 The credit balance in the bank
account was not included in the term ‘‘goods’’. 60 Morling
J. noted that it was ‘‘inappropriate to treat intangible
things . . . as ‘movables’ for any purpose other than the
conflict of laws’’. 61
The case of Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd. v.
Computer Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd. 62 supports the argument
that tangible qualities are contemplated in order for
software to be considered goods. Rogers J. held that the
sale of a computer system comprising both hardware
and software constituted a sale of goods. 63 It was
doubted whether the mere licensing of software
(without the supply of any tangible products) also constituted a sale of goods. In the case of ASX Operations Pty
Ltd. v. Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd., 64 it was decided that,
for the purposes of the Trade Practices Act, the term
‘‘goods’’ did not refer to encoded electrical signals. In St.
Albans City and District Council v. International Computers Ltd., 65 Sir Iain Glidewell made an important distinction between a software program and the physical
medium on which it is encoded. The Court held that
the physical medium, a computer disk, was considered a
‘‘good’’, but the program itself was not a ‘‘good’’. 66 The
intellectual property involved in the software programme always remained with the author, and St.
Albans merely received a licence to use the software.
It is arguable that cryptographic software in intangible form cannot be considered a ‘‘good’’ for the purpose of the EIPA. The abstract concepts of cryptography,
and other information concerning algorithms cannot be
considered goods for the purpose of the EIPA.

PSA: Amendments to the EIPA
The participating states of the WA have recognized
the deficiencies in the EIPA restrictions on the ‘‘export’’
of ‘‘goods’’ and ‘‘articles’’; amendments have therefore
been introduced to control the ‘‘transfer’’ of ‘‘technology.’’ These changes are included in Part 8 of the PSA
and have yet to come into force. The long title of the
EIPA will be changed to ‘‘[a]n Act respecting the export
and transfer of goods and technology and the import of
goods’’. 67 A new term, ‘‘technology,’’ will be defined as
follows:
‘‘technology’’ includes technical data, technical assistance
and information necessary for the development, production
or use of an article included in an Export Control List; 68

A new term, ‘‘transfer’’, will be defined as follows:
‘‘transfer’’ means, in relation to technology, to dispose of it
or disclose its contents in any manner from a place in
Canada to a place outside Canada. 69

The portion of section 3 of the EIPA before paragraph (a)
will be replaced by the following:
The Governor in Council may establish a list of goods and
technology, to be called an Export Control List, including
therein any article the export or transfer of which the Governor in Council deems it necessary to control for any of the
following purposes: 70

Section 4 will be replaced by the following:
The Governor in Council may establish a list of countries, to
be called an Area Control List, including therein any
country to which the Governor in Council deems it necessary to control the export or transfer of any goods or technology. 71

Technology as defined under the PSA includes cryptographic materials in both tangible and intangible
media. Under the amendments, International Trade
Canada can control and restrict all the technical means
for developing, producing, or using any of the listed
articles. In addition, ‘‘technical assistance and information’’ can include an individual’s thoughts or memories
with respect to the development, production, or use of
the articles listed on the ECL. The use of the terms
‘‘dispose’’ and ‘‘disclose’’ expand the concept of ‘‘transfer’’
of technology; any exposure of the information, technical data, or technical assistance falls under this definition. International telephone conversations about
restricted cryptographic products may be illegal. ‘‘[A]ny
other place’’, as referred to in section 15 of EIPA, may
restrict an academic in Canada from linking by video
conference to an international conference attended by
persons in a country on the Area Control List. 72

Summary
In summary, WA amendments have been introduced to impose export restrictions. Strong cryptography
cannot be exported or transferred out of Canada under
the amendments, except by permit. However, it is problematic to apply controls that depend on national borders and the tangibility of objects to the transmission of
intangible software and know-how on the Internet.
There are significant gaps in the imposed barriers with
mass market (retail) software, basic scientific research, the
minimum information necessary for a patent application, and software in the public domain, notwithstanding copyright protection.
The EIPA does not prohibit persons in Canada from
transferring cryptography from a source outside Canada
to a customer outside Canada. In that case, there is no
act of export. The EIPA may not prohibit persons in
Canada from transferring cryptographic software from
one server to another when both are located in Canada,
again because there is no export. One or more of the
following actions can avoid the restrictions of the WA:
●

Domicile research operations outside Canada.

●

Transfer cryptographic software from a server
outside Canada, even if sales and marketing
activities are located in Canada.
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●

●

●

●

Transfer cryptography products from a server in
Canada to a recipient’s server in Canada, relying
on verified customer statements of location and
intended use.
Take the position that the EIPA does not apply
to intangible cryptographic products.
Place a cryptographic product in the public
domain while maintaining copyright protection
on the software.
Produce mass market strong cryptography, since
mass market software is not controlled.

Canada’s Cryptography Policy
Canadian Law on Domestic Use and
Development of Cryptography
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T

here is a vibrant tension between cryptography
export controls and Canada’s policies concerning
the importance of cryptography to the development of
Canada’s economy. In contrast to the export regime,
domestic transactions involving cryptography are not
subject to controls; there are no laws in Canada
restricting the import and use of cryptography products
of any strength. Market forces determine demand for,
and the supply of, cryptography products for all applications, including stored data and real time communications. A supplier can distribute cryptography products of
any strength to anyone in Canada, without considering
the intended use of the customer, reporting the transaction to any public authority, or obtaining a licence to
engage in the transaction. Canadians are free to access
the supply of cryptography products from domestic or
foreign suppliers. Cryptography products can be distributed by any means, whether in intangible form over the
Internet or embedded in hardware or any other
medium.
Canadian patent law grants intellectual property
rights in cryptography products. Encryption software has
been patented since the early 1980s. RSA Security has
permitted free non-commercial use of its RSA algorithm
with written permission for academic or university
research purposes; the algorithm bears U.S. Patent
Number 4405829 dated September 20, 1983. 73 On September 6, 2000, RSA Security waived its patent rights in
the RSA algorithm and consented to the public dissemination of it. Similarly, U.S. Patent 3,962,539, which
describes the Data Encryption Standard (DES), was
assigned to IBM Corporation in 1976. IBM subsequently
offered royalty-free licences conditional on adherence to
the specifications of the standard, and the patent expired
in 1993. 74 In addition to these, there are several important and well-established patents in cryptography, some
of which have expired or been placed in the public
domain. The patents in the category of strong encryption

have been placed in Appendix 1 showing their date of
issue and expiration for ease of reference. 75
A patent is a species of intellectual property rights
that depends upon the patent applicant making full disclosure in clear terms of the features of the patent. There
is no territorial limitation on the availability of the information contained in an issued patent, so anyone can
access patent information on file with the Canadian
Patent Office from anywhere in the world for any purpose. This includes a patent on cryptography. As noted
above, the EIPA explicitly permits the export from
Canada of the minimum information necessary for a
patent.

The Development of Canada’s
Cryptography Policy
Canada recognized the significance of e-commerce
to the development of a robust and globally accessible
economy, as well as the importance of participating in
the global information infrastructure. E-commerce relies
upon the transfer of, access to, and safe storage of digital
information; the usefulness of cryptography in reducing
threats to e-commerce is undisputable. The use of information technology has risen as increasingly powerful
personal and networked computers communicate over
converged systems on the universal Internet. The
Internet supports both consumer and commercial activities, but also critical infrastructures such as energy, transportation, finance and communications. The nature,
volume, and sensitivity of digitally enhanced information continue to expand, but this growth depends on the
quality and dependability of cryptography. 76
The growth and development of e-commerce
depends upon the confidence of consumers and businesses in the safety and security of digital transactions.
The poison of hackers and digital fraudsters threatens ecommerce. Cryptography is the antidote to this poison; it
is both an art and a science for keeping secure data and
real-time communications. 77 Cryptography has been
described as the foundation of Internet commerce
because it ensures security and confidentiality of electronic communications. 78 Cryptography serves the function of authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation. As
summarized in an overview of the history of cryptography by the Canadian Security Establishment,
‘‘[s]oftware companies wish to protect their products
against piracy, banks want to ensure secure transactions
and almost everyone wishes to keep their personal information private.’’ 79 The objects of information security
are summarized in the Handbook of Applied Cryptography. 80
Cryptography developed from a rarefied mathematical discipline in the domain of military intelligence
strategists. There is now a major academic discipline in
cryptography, exemplified in Canada by the Centre for
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Applied Research in Cryptography at the University
of Waterloo. 8 1 IBM, 8 2 Microsoft, 8 3 and PricewaterhouseCoopers 84 have organized corresponding
international research and development activities.
Canada participated in the development of the
1997 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) Guidelines on Cryptography
Policy. The OECD Guidelines posited that national and
global information infrastructures were developing rapidly to provide a seamless network for worldwide communications. To make this possible, users of information
technology must have trust in the security of information and communications. The Guidelines consisted of a
set of eight principles to be weighed by nations in developing their national cryptography policy frameworks. 85
The recommendations can be summarized as follows:
1. Cryptography should be used to foster confidence in information and communications infrastructures, and to protect data security and privacy.
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2. Users should have the right to choose any cryptographic method, subject to applicable laws.
3. Government controls on cryptographic methods
should be no more than are essential to the discharge of governmental responsibilities.
4. Market forces should dictate the development in
cryptographic methods.
5. Technical standards, criteria, and protocols for
cryptographic methods should be developed and
promulgated at the national and international
level.
6. The fundamental rights of individuals to privacy,
including secrecy of communications and protections of personal data, should be respected in
national cryptography policies, in the implementation and the use of cryptographic methods.
7. In the case of encrypted data, it was contemplated that national cryptography polices may
allow lawful access to cryptographic keys or
plaintext.
8. Civil liability regimes should be applicable to
cryptographic service providers or parties
obtaining access to cryptographic keys or
plaintext, by means of contract or otherwise. It
was particularly recommended that cryptography
policies should not be implemented so as to
create unjustified obstacles to trade.
The OECD Guidelines reflected that globalization
is an integral element of business. ‘‘In a global trading
environment, the full advantages of electronic commerce
can only be achieved through a transition to open networks.’’ 86 However, open networks are susceptible to
information piracy:
In the world of open networks and in an environment
which is increasingly characterized by uncertainty and
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global economic competition, strong encryption enables
corporations to protect themselves from competitive intelligence-gathering and criminal threats, and to protect sensitive information and communications. 87

Cryptography is necessary in a borderless world to
enhance the creation of ‘‘virtual organizations’’ and forge
‘‘strategic partnerships’’ in cyberspace.
In February 1998, the Government of Canada produced a White Paper entitled ‘‘Cryptography Policy
Framework For Electronic Commerce: Building
Canada’s Information Economy and Society’’ under the
auspices of the Task Force of Electronic Commerce mandated by Industry Canada. Canada’s cryptographic policy
provided for the development of a public key infrastructure (PKI) that ‘‘will interface with private sector and
institutional PKIs adhering to similar levels of privacy,
integrity and security standards, in order to provide the
easy and seamless secure electronic transactions
demanded by Canadians’’. 88 Canada has earned a reputation as a world leader in telecommunications and
software sectors, with strength in cryptography products.
There is much to be said for the degree of consultation undertaken by the government of Canada in respect
of cryptography policy. The stakeholders are easily ascertained. There are the diverse police forces and security
agencies, which consider that cryptography is a threat to
law enforcement activities because it facilitates concealment and execution of criminal activity. There is the
domestic cryptography industry, with a gross direct production of about $300–$350M in annual volume, almost
90% of which is exported. 89 This industry employs
approximately 1300 persons, about 5% of the Canadian
workforce in information and telecommunications
industries. 90 This industry has been demanding a review
of Canada’s adherence to WA export controls, contending that these controls inhibit the competitive development of the domestic industry.
A consultation process regarding export controls
occurred in 1998. At that time, Industry Canada published ‘‘A Cryptography Policy Framework for Electronic
Commerce’’, which called for responses from participants to be presented over the ensuing months. In total,
over 200 responses were received, 91 with two competing
themes regarding export controls. Canada was being
placed at a competitive disadvantage by the current
application of export controls, and it was necessary to
maintain adherence to the WA in concert with the international community. Only 7% of respondents favoured
maintaining the status quo or extending export controls;
there was a clear overall preference for the elimination of
export controls. Some noted that the WA restrictions
were being interpreted in various ways by other states,
notably more stringently by the United States, while
European states such as Germany, Switzerland, and Ireland did not follow the WA protocols. The domestic
cryptography industry strongly submitted that Canada
should take maximum advantage of the flexibility in
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application of the WA provisions contemplated by the
terms of that arrangement. 92
The result of the consultation process was an adjustment in the implementation of export controls, which
Minister Manley announced in a speech on October 1,
1998:
Fourth, we will continue to implement cryptography
export controls within our commitments to the Wassenaar
Arrangement; however, we will ensure that Canadian cryptography manufacturers face a level playing field — our controls will take into account the practices of other countries
so that Canadian manufactures will not be at a competitive
disadvantage.
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Fifth, we will streamline the export permit process and
make it more transparent. For many products, users or destinations, after a ‘‘one time review’’ of the product, general or
multi-destination, multiuser permits will be issued. Our
intention is to simplify and speed up decision making, and
significantly reduce the ‘‘regulatory drag’’ on exporters. We
do not want them to be late to market. 93

These policies were implemented by a Notice to
Exporters under the EIPA, explaining intended changes
to the permit process for ‘‘Export Controls on Cryptographic Goods’’. 94 The purpose of the Notice to
Exporters was stated to be to inform the exporting community of
(a) proposed changes to Canada’s export controls on
cryptographic goods as a result of recent changes to
the Wassenaar Arrangement Lists of controlled
goods and technology; and
(b) the procedures that have been implemented to
streamline the export permit process for cryptographic goods to make the process more transparent. 95

The intent of the proposed amendments was to
streamline the export process, ‘‘to better position Canadian exporters to increase their sales and share in global
markets while being mindful of security interests’’. 96 The
liberalizations contemplated by the Notice to Exporters
were in accordance with the actions of the participating
states of the WA as described in its annual protocols.
First, goods were to be removed from controls if they
performed certain functions of particular assistance to ecommerce. These included authentication, digital signature, PINs, key lengths of 56 bits or less, asymmetric
algorithms within specified parameters defined by
industry standards (RSA, Diffie-Hellman, etc.), consumer
broadcast signals, non-user-accessible encryption technologies used for securing software and copyrightprotected media, goods designed for banking and money
transactions, and limited wireless communications
equipment. 97 In addition, reporting requirements were
to be removed. The exemption from export controls for
goods in the public domain was to be maintained. 98
The Notice to Exporters articulated Canada’s commitment to encourage the widespread use of strong
encryption and the growth of export markets for Canadian technologies. 99 Subject to these differences, Canada
continues to adhere to the WA.

A test of the efficacy of these changes was undertaken by AEPOS Technologies Corporation in the
‘‘Exploratory Review’’, which was completed in 2000,
but was not released to the public. A ‘‘Report to Consultation Participants’’ was released on March 7, 2001. 100
The sensitive subject of export controls was presented as
follows:
The issue of export controls per se did not appear in the
data collection template nor was it our intention to raise the
subject, but many companies expressed concern over the
way export controls are being applied and administered by
the federal government. Usually the issue was raised in
response to one or more of the following questions:

Are there any factors that make it difficult for the company to conduct its development, production or research
activities in Canada?
Are there factors that might cause the company to move
operations/research outside the country? If so, what are
they?
Are there factors that would encourage the company to
do more work in Canada or repatriate some of the work
currently done abroad? And
Are there obstacles to growth in Canada?
Three areas of concern were mentioned repeatedly: the fact
that mass market/retail crypto is treated differently by the
U.S. and Canada when processing export applications (i.e.,
the U.S. is more liberal in applying Wassenaar rules); the
excessive time taken to respond to companies when they
apply for an export permit or try to get direction or guidance; and the requirement for end-user statements which,
it is claimed, potentially create unlimited liability.
The concerns over export issues were reflected in detail in
the body of the report. 101

The study indicated that it is widely regarded as
very important for Canada to maintain a strong and
independent cryptographic capability in the face of
increasing internationalization of the industry. Canada’s
strengths in cryptography are widely recognized and
respected, and loss or diminution of such expertise
would adversely affect Canada’s ability to play a major
role in helping develop complex applications.
A revision of this consultation process was undertaken during the legislature’s process to amend the EIPA,
leading to a re-statement of the reservations of the
domestic industry with regard to the imposition and
application of export controls:
None of the companies has considered in detail the possible
effects of the new legislation (Bills C36, 42 [changed to Bill
C-[7]] & 44) and companies are not particularly concerned
as long as cryptography export regulations continue to be
administered as they are being administered now. However,
if the new law were to be applied in a way that makes the
export of cryptography (or any other sort of technology or
intellectual property) more difficult, industry would not be
happy. 102

The domestic cryptography industry is aware of the
lack of uniformity and consistency in implementation by
WA Participating States and others. The Global Internet
Liberty Campaign published an international survey of
encryption policies. 103 The survey was conducted by the
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Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC) and was a
follow-up to submissions to the OECD in connection
with the OECD’s development of cryptography policy in
1996. It revealed the inconsistency amongst nations with
regard to policies and laws on this area. It also demonstrated the controversy over and lack of uniformity in
the implementation of WA-style export controls within
Canada and elsewhere. This point is expansively demonstrated in the research embodied in Grabow’s ‘‘Changes
in Cryptographic Export-Import Rules’’. 104
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Expressive Cryptography
The term ‘‘expressive cryptography’’ refers to the
concept that cryptography consists of more than bits and
bytes; it includes a field of science in which mathematicians strive to develop advanced algorithms, create codes,
break codes, and design systems to generate these codes.
These activities may take place at renowned academic
institutions populated by scholars, and in industry carrying on business in the mainstream economy. These
activities may take place in the minds and purposes of
cyber-criminals. How do the WA export controls affect
these diverse activities? Specifically, can the export controls be applied to restrict academic and commercial
communication of cryptography concepts and products?
One consideration that should inform the EIPA amendments is whether they infringe upon freedoms guaranteed under the Charter, specifically paragraph 2(b) which
generates freedom of expression.
The Supreme Court in Irwin Toy v. Quebec
(Attorney General) 105 defined constitutionally protected
expression as that which communicates thoughts, ideas
or meaning. Commercial expression is protected by paragraph 2(b). This holding was reiterated in RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 106, and in R. v
Guignard. 107 According to Prof. Hogg, ‘‘so long as the
[criminal] activity is communicative, and falls short of the
direct infliction of violence, it is protected by s. 2(b).’’ 108
The same issues arose in Bernstein v. United States
Department of Justice. 109 A mathematics academic
named Bernstein asked the Office of Defense Trade
Controls whether an export permit was required to publish a cryptographic algorithm called ‘‘Snuffle’’, a computer source code, and an English description of the
algorithm. After being advised that all aspects of his
research were subject to export licensing requirements,
Bernstein sought a declaratory judgment preventing the
Department of State from enforcing export controls in
relation to his travel to an international conference of
cryptographers. The California District Court ruled that
the licensing requirement for the export of cryptographic
software was an unconstitutional prior restraint of protected speech. In addition, the Court deemed the cryptographic computer source code protected speech under
the First Amendment and the permit regime unconstitutional prior restraint.
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The U.S. case of DVD Copy Control Association v.
Bunner 110 concerned an appeal against a prior restraint
order, which prohibited the defendants from republishing decryption software on their web sites. This
software decrypted the encryption code limiting access
to DVD movies. The issue before the Court was whether
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
protected the publication of cryptographic information
as an exercise of free speech. The California Court of
Appeal concluded that computer source code 111 contained communicative elements and was constitutionally protected speech:
The fact that a medium of expression has a functional
capacity should not preclude constitutional protection . . .
[C]omputer source code, though unintelligible to many, is
the preferred method of communication among computer
programmers. Because computer source code is an expressive means for the exchange of information and ideas about
computer programming, we hold that it is protected by the
First Amendment. (Junger v. Daley (6th Cir. 2000) 209 F.3d
481, 484-485). 112

The U.S. Second Circuit of Court of Appeals in Universal
City Studios Inc. et al. v. Corley 113 also held that computer code is constitutionally protected speech because it
is a medium for the communication of human thoughts
or ideas. 114
In Canada, computer source code, a human-readable language of expressing thoughts and commands on
the operation of computers, would be considered a form
of expression eligible for constitutional protection. Canadian law protects all media for expressing meaning,
including words and non-verbal language. The requirement of an export control permit is a prior restraint or
limit on freedom of expression. ‘‘[A] prior restraint is a
law that prohibits the publication of particular material
either absolutely or under a requirement of prior
approval by a censor.’’ 115 Cryptographic expression that
is never published cannot contribute in any way to the
marketplace of ideas, to personal fulfillment, or to actualization.
As the export controls would require a permit to
transmit across Canadian borders restricted cryptography, the question is whether EIPA restrictions on
expressive forms of cryptography can survive a section 1
Charter analysis. R. v. Oakes 116 outlined four criteria that
a law must meet to impose reasonable and justifiable
limits on rights in a ‘‘free and democratic society’’:
1. Sufficiently important objective: The law must
pursue an objective that is sufficiently important to
justify limiting a Charter right.
2. Rational connection: The law must be rationally
connected to the objective.
3. Least drastic means: The law must impair the right
no more than is necessary to accomplish the objective.
4. Proportionate effect: The law must not have a disproportionately severe effect on the persons to
whom it applies. 117
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Part 2 of the Oakes test focuses on a rational connection between the objective of the law and the measures enacted by the law. Strong encryption theory is
taught at universities and published in numerous books
available worldwide and on the Internet. There is
nothing in the PSA restricting foreigners from coming to
Canada to participate in cryptography conferences. The
objective of the EIPA in implementing the WA is to
restrict the distribution of strong cryptography. The ECL
suffers from inconsistency, as it prohibits the export of
strong cryptography, unless it is in the public domain,
but there is no prohibition against putting strong cryptography in the public domain. This means that a Canadian academic intending to disseminate a treatise containing information on strong cryptography must
publish his or her paper before traveling abroad to a
conference to present it. The inconsistency in the ECL is
accentuated by the absence of legal controls of any kind
on the domestic distribution of strong cryptography. If
expressive versions of strong cryptography can be disseminated in Canada without restriction and placed in
the public domain worldwide, why cannot they be transmitted to an identified recipient out of Canada without
a permit? The experience of the U.S. with its export
controls 118 indicates that the gaps in export controls may
make them ineffective. According to Kerben, the U.S.
government’s asserted interest in national security failed
to account for the fact that the number of encryption
products in foreign countries had steadily risen to the
point that foreign corporations were supplying the
American market with encryption products. 119 Recognizing this, the U.S took steps in 2000 to scale down its
export restrictions on powerful encryption technology,
in an effort to match the European Union’s liberalization
of rules governing the export of encryption products. 120
The EIPA amendments are constitutionally suspect,
to the extent that they restrict the dissemination of
expressive forms of cryptography. There is a continuum
of communication in cryptography, from politically
motivated presentations of strong cryptography, such as
that by digital anarchists, to source code that may be
exchanged between vendors and consumers of software
products. The closer the facts are to academic and political expression about cryptography, the greater the likelihood that the EIPA amendments and the ECL restrictions will be declared unconstitutional in their design, or
their application to particular fact situations. Limitations
on publication of cryptography cannot be justified when
that cryptography material is available to foreigners in
Canada. It is difficult to imagine that the export of cryptographic technology originating in Canada would ‘‘generate a national security threat when equivalent and even
superior technology is already available abroad’’. 121
It is recognized that public security concerns constitute an important governmental objective for the purposes of the Oakes test, part 1. 122 The court will defer to
legislative measures to address concerns relating to
public safety. 123 But the means employed to address
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these concerns will be subject to judicial scrutiny in
which core constitutional values, such as freedom of
expression, are at stake. The gaps in export controls, and
the dichotomy in domestic freedom to discriminate
against all cryptography, create a significant risk that legislative controls on expressive cryptography will be
found to contravene the Charter.

Conclusions

T

he government of Canada has taken major steps
forward in the adoption of a cryptography policy
that is dedicated to the development of Canada’s
domestic cryptography industry. The policy is part of the
basic objective to make Canada a world leader in ecommerce, and cannot be accomplished without the
security provided by effective cryptography and other
means.
There is an inconsistency between the policy of
domestic digital freedom in cryptography and the restrictions imposed by export controls. A policy choice must
be made: should export controls be further relaxed
within the parameters of the WA? There are serious
defects in the WA, particularly as applied to the distribution of intangible cryptography on the Internet. There is
no evidence that export controls are an effective method
of preventing the distribution of strong cryptography.
There is no empirical evidence that strong cryptography
does not already exist in the states identified on the
ACL. The ECL has significant loopholes — mass market
and public domain cryptographic products are not controlled, and cryptographic algorithms and information
can be found on the Internet.
The current EIPA provisions do not apply to
Internet distribution of intangible cryptography. The
proposed amendments are unlikely to withstand a constitutional challenge, and can easily be circumvented by
simple methods, such as requiring customers to provide
a domestic Internet address for transmission of cryptographic software.
The WA text makes it clear that participating states
are entitled to implement the WA in the manner they
deem appropriate under their national policies and laws.
The actions of any one participating state, such as the
control of cryptographic technology, do not obligate
other states to adhere to the same public policy. Canada
is free to adopt and implement a made-in-Canada policy
for the export of cryptographic goods.
Canada should exercise its discretion under the WA
to remove ex ante export controls, in favour of a simple
registration system that requires exporters to notify International Trade Canada of transactions involving the
supply or sale of cryptographic products to customers
outside Canada. There should be no requirement to
obtain a permit in advance; domestic producers should
not be vulnerable to the uncertainty of whether an
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export permit will be granted, and when. The timing
and pace of cryptography transactions should be determined entirely by commercial considerations, not regulatory efficiencies. Reporting cryptography transactions
should be sufficient to enable Canada to participate in

the reporting and consultation process contemplated by
the WA. In this way, Canada’s cryptography policy will
become more consistent with the objectives of making
Canada a world leader in e-commerce.
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Important Patents in Cryptography 124
PATENT
OR IGIN
A ND #

DATE FILED

DATE ISSUED

ASSIGNEE

PUBLIC
DOMAIN

EXPIR ED

US #3, 962,
539

Februar y 24, 1975

June 8, 1976

IBM

Yes

Yes

Dif f ie-Hellman 126 Hellman, Diff ie
and Merkle

U.S. Patent:
4,200,770

September 6, 1977

Apr il 29, 1980

Stanford
Universit y

Yes

Yes

Public-key
cr yptosystems 127

Hellman and
Merkle

U.S. Patent:
4,218,582

October 6, 1977

August 19, 1980

Stanford
Universit y

Yes

Yes

RSA 128

Rivest, Shamir,
Adleman

U. S. Patent
4, 405, 829

December 14, 1977

September 20, 1983

MI T

Fiat-Shamir
identif ication 129

Shamir and Fiat

U.S. Patent:
4,748,668

July 9, 1986

May 31, 1988

Yeda Research
and
Development
(Israel)

Control vectors 130 Mat yas, Meyer,
and Brachtl

U.S. Patent:
4,850,017

May 29, 1987

July 18, 1989

IBM

GQ
identif ication 131

Guillou and
Quisquater

U.S. Patent:
5,140,634

October 9, 1991

August 18, 1992

U.S. Phillips
Cor poration

DSA 132

Kravitz

U.S. Patent:
5,231,668

July 26, 1991

July 27, 1993

United States
of Amer ica

Fair
cr yptosystems 133

Micali

U.S. Patent:
5,315,658

Apr il 19, 1993

May 24, 1994

none

PATENT

INVENTOR

DES 125

Ehrsam et al.

Notes:
1

Best efforts were undertaken to represent the law and any references as of
August 15, 2005.

8

On November 16, 1993, representatives of the 17 COCOM member
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